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IN A PIG'S EYE:
DAILY LIFE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
John W. Cole
Introduction
----------I would like to offer some thoughts about how to understand the conditions of everyday life in the countries of southeastern Europe and about
why this is worth doing. Since I am an anthropologist, it will not come as
any surprise that I am enamored of research into small-scale social units:
the stock in trade of anthropologists is to examine social, political and
economic phenomena from the bottom up. One of my colleagues likes to call
this the pig's eye view of the world: that is, the view that researchers
get when they leave office or archieve and spend some time in the village
mud. What I hope to illustrate is that this view can produce more than a
collection of charming monographs about life in isolated villages and urban
ghettos, or about the organization of particular factories or collective
farms. The study of any country not informed by the pig's eye view is
likely to be wide of the mark. This is not merely to say that it is a good
idea to know what goes on in the village as well as in the politburo,
although I do think that is true, too. Rather, it is to say that forces
generated from below regularly influence what is happening at the top. If
one would really understand what is going on in the capital, then one had
best understand the kinds of interests in the provinces that leaders in the
capital are responding to.
I will say at the outset that I have reservations about much of mainstream Western scholarship on Southeastern Europe. These reservations grow
out of what I see as the frequent use of ill-conceived comparisons and
ethnocentrism and gratuitous moralizing in place of analytic conclusions.
There are alternative ways to intellectualize about Southeastern Europe,
and these are beginning to provide interesting and useful alternatives to
some of the conventional wisdom about the area. For example, I question
the validity of comparisons between the conditions of life in Southeastern
Europe and those in Western Europe or the United States. The past
experiences of these areas are so different that comparison between them is
spurious and often ethnocentric. More valid comparisons are to be made
with other agrarian areas, even when these are located on other continents.
About Corporate Structures and Aggregate Data
The main focus of Western research about contemporary and modern Southeastern Europe lies in studies of the actions of leaders and of the nature
of the party and state organization, and in the compilation and analysis of
aggregate economic, social and political data. This research is about how
policies are made and implemented and about the effect of these policies on
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the population at large. It also includes an evaluation or assessment of
how things are going over there, mostly done by comparing policy goals with
results and by comparing economic and social indicators with those in the
countries of Western Europe and the United States.
At the most abstract level, these studies view society as an outcome of
policy. Lying behind this view, sometimes referred to as the "idealist"
approach, is an assumption that these are centralized totalitarian states
where all of the important decisions are made by a small clique of ruling
communists who impose their will on the institutions and people of the
country. In one of the two main variants of this approach, policies, and
hence the characteristics of society, are derived from Marxist-Leninist
thought. Such studies stress the contrasts between East and West, making
invidious comparisons with the way in which society is determined in the
decentralized, pluralistic Western democracies. 1
The second variant deems ideology irrelevant and instead finds policy
determined by both the nature of the country's techno-economic character
and the imperatives of economic development. Differences between East and
West are attributed to different degrees of development, which are in turn
a consequence of variations in the extent of industrialization. These
studies postulate a convergence in social and political forms, regardless
of ideology, as the countries of Southeastern Europe "catch up with" the
West in industrial capacity. 2
In the main, the economy and society of Southeastern European countries
are represented in Western literature by statistical trends. While some
attention is paid to regional variation within particular countries, data
are characteristically aggregated for whole countries. Central to analysis
of such data is the establishment of trends based on a comparison of
figures for a series of years. Correlations can then be made between
different sectors of the economy, economic development and social or demographic trends correlated, the effects of policy in one realm or another
assessed, and the direction of future trends predicted. 3
We have learned a great deal about Southeastern Europe as a result of
research of this type. What it fails to provide, however, is any sense of
the social dynamics which produce the trends that it purports to describe.
It does not take into account the many different social groupings and their
social, political and economic characteristics. While national leaders are
carefully studied, they are not the only individuals in the society who
have goals to pursue, and the formal or corporate organizations of state
and party are not the only framework within which individuals work toward
their goals. The interests of all social segments obviously do not always
correspond with those of the national leadership, and it is not safe to
assume that one can ignore these segments as being of minor significance.
The workings of Southeastern European societies result from the interplay
of their different social segments, and not just from a population
responding to the dictates of the leadership.

160

Unfortunately, data collected and published in national statistics, and
analyses based on them, provide few clues about the nature or expressions
of the interests of these social segments. One cannot discern whether an
aggregate figure represents a series of data which are mutually reinforcing, or whether it is an averaging of divergent trends. For example, if a
statistic is pUblished which shows a national increase in the production of
grain, has this resulted from small increases throughout the country, or
has production gone up sUbstantially in some areas and down in others? If
the birth rate rises, does this reflect a society-wide phenomenon, or is it
a result of an increase among only cer tain social segments of the population? There is no way to answer questions such as these on the basis of
aggregate data alone, and projections based upon statistically determined
trends using aggregate data are notoriously inaccurate. In ignoring the
dynamics of society, such projections miss the growing power of trends
masked for a time by temporar i1y prevalent, but waning, forces.
If one is to know what a country is like, one 1Illst know the social
processes behind the aggregate data. The problem, then, is to identifY the
range of interests within each country and the nature of the social relations through which they are expressed. Access to the data from which
pUblished statistics were der ived can sometimes provide useful clues, out
one cannot count on it. After all, the census taker had his own priorities
and conceptual framework, and it would De remarkable if they overlapped
very much with those of the researcher. In the end there is only one
solution to the problem of uncovering the dynamics of society: one must get
out into the field and gather one's own data.
A Few Pig's Eye Observations
Several examples of the problems that can arise from aggregate
analysis, and how these can be illuminated by research into small scale
social units, illustrate this point. Marxist and positivist thought are in
agreement that modernization results in the transformation of complex
extended families into nuclear ones, in a reduction in family size, and in
the general erosion of ties of kith and kin outside the family. The
personalistic ties represented by these social relations are said to be
characteristic of agrarian societies where the household is the unit of
production and activities of more than one household scope are organized
through alliances between households. With industrialization, the household is 00 longer the unit of production, and each nuclear family becomes
self-sufficient through wages earned by its adult members. with urbanization, related families become dispersed and, lacking compelling economic
reasons to interrelate, ties between them are reduced to sporadic sociable
occasions before withering away altogether. Such assistance as the family
requires beyond its own means is to be found in the bureaucratic ministerings of the welfare state. Relations between members of individual
households are now forged in the productive, political, educational and
other ' institutions of modern society. With the transformation of peasants
into agricultural workers, the process of nuclearization is expected to
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penetrate the countryside as well. Any vestiges of extended families or of
personalistic social networks between families are interpreted as an
expression of traditional conservatism. Such phenomena are expected to
disappear with the passage of time. 4
The countries of Southeastern Europe in general, and Romania in
particular, are all clearly undergoing industrialization and urbanization.
In Romania the percentage of the population employed in urban occupations
and the percentage of individuals living in cities have increased substantially since the end of World War II. At the same time, the population has
increased from under 16 million (1948) to over 21 million (1977). Moreover, over 90 percent of Romanian agriculture is carried out on either
state or cooperative farms. Romania can therefore be expected to show the
social trends that are presumed to accompany modernization1 and, indeed,
national statistics and scholarly analysis based on them show the expected
nuc1earization and reduced family size. As predicted, urban areas exhibit
significantly lower percentages of extended families and smaller family
sizes than do rural areas. However, both family size and the number of
extended families are being reduced in the countryside as well. The few
areas where private agriculture remains show the highest percentages of
extended fami1ies. S
In spite of this information, detailed research in Bra~ov County, one
of the most industrialized in the country, and subsequent examination of
statistical data from other parts of the country "from the bottom up,"
suggest that something rather different is going on. First, we found that
a three-generation strategy dominates communities of worker villages in the
hinterlands of industrial cities and that it is also strongly represented
in the cities themselves. Second, we found that these extended family
strategies were not merely a survival of a traditional social form among
conservative ex-peasants, but that they are being constantly recreated out
of the conditions of modern life in Romania. Third, the areas where the
extended family is under the most threat are those which are most remote
from urban centers. Our conclusion is that the apparent nuclearization
trend in Romania is more an artifact of the nature of the census than of
the realities of social life. 6
The people who live in BraJov County have worked out a way to take
advantage of a combination of rural location and proximity to cities in
order to have the best of both urban and rural worlds. Their optimum
strategy is to have at least one individual employed in town, while one
works for the local cooperative farm and yet another remains at home to
care for their own animals and private garden plots. This is most
effective where there are at least three adult members of the household,
and the extended family is an obvious way to do this. By deploying its
workforce in this way a household is able to provide for subsistence needs
from the agricultural products its members raise at home and receive from
the cooperative farm as pay. Almost all of the money earned by the urban
worker can then be devoted to consumer goods which improve the household's
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standard of living. Clothing, home furnishings, seaside and foreign
vacations, and even au toroooiles are high on their list of preferences.
These household are usually made up of a married couple, their
children, and one or more of their parents; more than one-half of the
adults in these villages lived in such extended family households.
However, we learned that this is not the only three""generation strategy.
Although many of the younger generation take apartments in town and DOth
husoand and wife work in the city, they nevertheless retain close ties with
their parents oack in the village. Consumer goods purchased in the city
constantly flow out to the parents in the village and agricultural produce
flows to the children in the city. Visiting oack and forth between town
and country is incessant, and in a small out Significant number of cases
the children of uroan dwelling couples live in the village with their
grandparents. The resulting level of economic and oocial interdependence
is so great that it differs little from that of the three-<Jenerational
household.
While the roost intensive social and economic ties are roost often
oetween parents and their offspring, there are aloo important links among
village households and between them and the households of former villagers
living in nearoy towns. Siolings, cousins, neighoors, ritual kin, classmates and other COmbinations of individuals cooperate in an endless variety
of ritual, social and economic endeavor s. These range from attending
weddings, where cash gifts enaole the newlyweds to o~ furnishings for
their home, to helping a neighoor reouild a oarn, to finding a joo in a
factory for a godoon. These are not just occasional peripheral phenomena,
out rather a constant element of life; everyone is constantly involved in
giving and receiving such support.
Similar kinds of relations exist aroong families who have "always" oeen
city residents. Within cities a variant of the three-<Jenerational strategy
is well established. Retired grandparents are the roost reliable baoysitters. They aloo have the time to keep active in networks over which
flows information about where scarce and desiraOle consumer items can De
found, and to stand in the queues which characterize everyday shopping and
become especially long when word spreads that some scarce item has suddenly
become availaole. In return for these efforts, older individuals can
expect to share some of the comforts provided oy their offsprings' wages
that they would not be aole to enjoy on a pensioner's income alone. In the
cities, this cooperation is transformed into a three""genera tiona I household much less often than in rural areas or villages, in the main because
of the small size of apartments, constructed with nuclear families in mind.
No matter OOW close the cooperation, a desire to maximize the total amount
of living space availaole to the group as a whole leads them to retain
their separate households.
The strength of these ties in uroanized counties is in rather marked
contrast to social developments in counties which do not have urban
centers. In these relOOte areas villagers do not have the option of working
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in town while living in the village, and individuals have few vocations
other than agriculture to choose from. If they wish to pursue some other
career, they have little choice but to leave the village and move to a
distant city. with higher pay and more cultural attractions to be found in
the cities, that is exactly what most young people are doing. Since a
three-generational strategy is much harder to work at a distance, young
people who migrate more often live as nuclear family units. Moreover, as
older couples are left behind to fend for themselves, migration also
creates nuclear family households in rural areas. Thus, the process of
nuclearization is actually more characteristic of remote areas of the
country than it is of those close to town. While agriculture-based
extended families continue to exist, their numbers are being reduced as a
result of an uneven development that draws migrants away to other parts of
the country.
In summary, we found that both in cities and in villages in urbanized
regions there is very intense domestic cooperation across generational
lines, cooperation which in the villages is associated with threegenerational households. However, both in cities and in town-and-country
combinations, the cooperation takes place between closely related couples
who live in different households. In contrast, migration from villages in
remote parts of the country tends to leave nuclear families behind in the
village at the same time that it creates new ones in the city. The
aggregate data for the country at large, based on a census of households,
cannot include information on the quality of social relations between
members of different households. It therefore misses those threegenerational strategies which are not based on residence, as well as the
generally high level of ritual, social and economic interaction found in
modern Romanian worker villages. Nor can it differentiate between the
social processes going on in villages proximate to urban centers and those
that are more distant from cities. As a result, it presents a false image
of the realities of social relations in modern Romania.
It would be a mistake to view these domestic relations as a temporary,
transient phenomenon associated with an early stage in modernization. In
fact, they are consistent with long-range Romanian economic and social
planning. Instead of trying to build urban apartments for the entire
industrial work force, the Romanians have developed an elaborate economic
infrastructure connecting village to town and are depending on commuting
labor. In Brasov County, 40 percent of the urban work force resides in the
countryside. Moreover, through an aspect of planning called systematization, the Romanians intend to strengthen this pattern and to increase the
cultural and social services available to villagers so as to reduce
discrepancies between rural and urban life styles. At the same time,
another aspect of their planning, carried out under the rubric of multilateral development, is to expand industrial development in the more remote
areas of the country. To the extent that this is successful, it will
reduce migration and increase the opportunities for villagers in remote
areas to elect urban employment while living at home in the village. One
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can reasonably expect that this will establish the same domestic patterns
in these areas as row exist in Bra;;ov and other urban counties.
Corpora te and Noocorpora te In ter re la t ions
Three-generation domestic strategies and networks of social relations
among people in town and country are no epiphenomena or mere curiosities.
They are elements in a noocorporate social structure which pervades all
aspects of R>manian li fe and influences the way in which poli tical,
economic and social change is taking place. Indeed, even the operation of
the R:>manian corporate world of party and state organization cannot be
properly understood without refereoce to it.* Let me illustrate this by an
exanple.
A Romanian acquaintaoce was the director of a distr ibution center for
bOttled gas used in cooking stoves. B:>ttled gas is available only through
such centers and can only be obtained by turning in an enpty bottle and
paying for the gas in the full bOttle. Since there was a slightly higher
demand for gas than could be filled out of available inventory, a list was
established. One's place on the list was determined by how long it had
been since one had last received a full bottle. Since supplies of full
bOttles were received at frequent intervals, there was rarely a delay of
more than a few days for anyone who used his gas at a reasonable rate. The
formal system of operation for the center was thus quite sinple and
orderly.
However, there was always a danger that the ability of the center to
meet demand might deteriorate, requiring some people to wait even longer to
receive their gas. Against this eventuality, people did what they could to
make sure that they would not be among those who waited. My acquaintaoce
was the recipient of an endless stream of small favors: neighbors and
relatives stopped by his house to leave off a few eggs or some home-baked
goods; urban acquaintaoces would stand him a glass of j:uic'ti whenever he
ventured into a local bar; when shopping, he would often be waved to the
front of the line; party offic ials stopped by his office from time to
time personally to let him know about the inplications of a new regulation,
and so on. He had many good, generous friends and admiring relatives, and

*By corporate and noncorporate I mean the same thing that some writers mean
by formal and informal. While not entirely satisfied with my choice of
terms, formal and informal leave me uneasy because of the inplication that
informal relations, in contrast to formal ones, lack structure, decidedly
rot the case. Noocorpora te (informal) relations lack a char ter, constitution or table of organization. For a discussion of the patterns which noncorporate relationships can take, see Jeremy Boissevain,
Fr iends of Fr iends: Networks, Manipulators and Coali tions (Oxford,
1974: Blackwell).
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life went along smoothly as long as his supply of bOttled gas was great
enough to fill everyone's request with a minimum of delay. Although he was
actually distr ibuting the gas in accordarce with prescr ibed bureaucratic
procedures, his fr iends arii relatives were content to think that he was
giving them special treatment.
Unfortunately, in 1974 a sudden and severe crisis in the bottled gas
industry left my acquaintance in the untenable position of having a lot of
people in need of gas looking for him to remind him of their special
relationship at the same time that he had few bOttles of gas to distribute.
He managed to weather the storm, but during the crisis he lived like a
hunted nan. He stayed home "sick" as much as he dared, conpletely avoided
pUblic places like bUses arii bars, and at work managed to keep bUSY in the
m:>st rem:>te warehouses, when he could not come up with a reas:>n to be away
from the distr ibution center altogether.
'!he point of this story is that a knowledge of the formal organization
of an enterprise or bureau is not necessar ily sufficient to understarii how
it actually works. Had my acquaintance merely been performing his bureaucratic furction, he could have remained in the open during the crisis,
blaming "the system" for the shar tage of gas. But since he had allowed the
impression to develop that he was providing gas as a personal favor, his
failure to deliver even during a general crisis was interpreted as a breach
in social relations. If we went on to pursue this episode further, we
would discover that the attenpts to influence the distribution center
director were not random, but were in fact determined by pre-existing
relationships. Ties of kith and kin, relations which are a part of the
noncorporate organization of s:>cial relations in the county, enmeshed the
director even before he obtained h is administrative post. But some of the
claims also came from fellow bureaucra ts, and developed ou t of a recognition that individuals who hold formal positions within the corporate
structure can establish personal relationships am:>ng themselves to Obtain
favors and to facilitate the performance of office. Gifts and favors given
in appreciation for, or in anticipation of, other favors, arii the use of
influerce based on corporate and noncorporate relationships are an integral
part of R:>manian society.
The implementa tion of policy in R:>mania is always affected by the way
in which the norcorporate structure is mobilized in relation to it.
Marxist theory says nothing about what noncorpora te relationships should be
like uriier socialism, beyond the expectation that they will become less
significant through economic development. Therefore, the noncorpora te
structure is dealt with on a tactical, ad hoc oasis. When it is used to
circumvent or subVert the goals of the party and state, it can be severely
repressed. At other times, national policy can be designed to placate it
as in the reorganization of agr icultural br igades and work teams in the
early seventies. Social relations in R:>manian villages had originally been
ignored in determining the groupings of people into work units. When this
proved unpopular in the villages arii, as a consequence, undermined production, work units were restructured to take into account these noncorporate
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relationships. This reorganization was relatively well-received and
resulted in more enthusiastic labor and better production. The changes in
remunerations policies for cooperative farms, increasing payments in kind
and reducing the number of tasks recompensed in cash, were a similar
acquiescence to "popular demand."7
If at times the formation of policy is a compromise between the goals
of party and those of local populations, on other occasions the party
itself initiates the mobilization of noncorporate networks in order to
achieve its ends. A particularly dramatic instance was the formation of
the agricultural production collectives which took place in stages over
more than a decade. At a crucial juncture in 1961-1963, the process was
brought to completion, and all villages which had been passed over earlier
were to be collectivized (except for a few in the mountains). Professor
David Kideckel has detailed exactly how this was accomplished in one
village, Hirseni, in County BraJov. Although the population in Hirseni was
for the most part skeptical about the advantages of collectives and reluctant to join, in the end the farm was established. While the impetus for
the establishment of the farm certainly came "from above," its formation
was not the result of the naked application of state power. Local and
visiting county officials incessantly visited village households, but the
decisive factor in formation of the collective was the mobilization of the
noncorporate networks of kith and kin.
Former villagers who held party and administrative posts in other
places, and even factory workers and students, were sent home to convince
their friends and relatives to become members of the farm. Virtually
everyone who had both a tie to the village and a stake in a state or party
position was mobilized in this effort at suasion. Especially intensive
efforts were made to induce promiment village households to join the farm.
As each household enrolled in the farm, its members were then also
recruited to add their voices to the others. In the end, virtually every
household became a member of the Hirseni cooperative. While the goal of
forming the farm had come from outside of the village, the method of
mobilizing the village behind the farm was consistent with the way in which
a village-wide consensus had been reached on issues of importance in the
past.S
The development of a separation of interests between the corporate and
noncorporate sectors presents a danger for socialist states in Southeastern Europe. One hears people refer to the officials as "them," and
there have been incidents, such as the protest in the Jiu valley, where a
segment of the population has mobilized to express its dissatisfaction with
state policy. On a more mundane level, the success or failure of local
level officials is in large measure determined by their success or failure
in establishing a working relationship with local networks. Certainly the
national leadership understands that this is a problem and also that on
occasion the interests of party and of particular communities or population
segments may be at odds. It insists, however, that there is identity of
interest over the long run, and that such differences are only over short167

term goals. Since such differences could result. in overt antagonisms and
open conflict, it is important to the leadership that they be identified
ear ly and that appropr ia te measures be taken. Appropr ia te measures can
include an effort to explain the policy more effectively in cases where the
communities have a false uMerstanding, modification of the policy where
the problem results from the failing of policy-makers, or the re-education
or even removal of officials who have misapplied policy (the solution in
the Jiu valley case) • In lbmania the potential ser iousness of the problem
is indica ted by the ongoing efforts of the par ty to merge socialist and
folk symbolism to create an identity between being lbmanian and being
socialist. Also, the first secretary of the Cbmmunist Par ty, Nicolae
Ceausescu, periodically takes to the airwaves, or has an item pUblished in
the daily newspaper SCinteia, exhorting par ty and state officials to leave
their desks and travel to their home communities to explain and promote new
or modified policies.
~

In the modern sociali st sta tes of SOutheastern Ell rope, while both
corpora te and noncorpora te organizations exist as partially autonomous
social processes, they are also intertwined. One cannot fully understand
how the one works without uMerstanding the other. '!hose of us who study
small-scale phenomena have learned that we cannot uooersta nd li fe in
village or town without taking into account the workings of par ty, state
aoo national economy. we have also learned that explanations of party and
state are equally inconplete without an uMerstanding of the workings of
noncorporate processes. This can oest be acconplished through the detailed
field study of small-scale units.9
Agrarian States in the Modern World
When governments dominated by Cbnmunist parties were established in
Southeastern Ellrope in the aftermath of WOrld War II, i t ~s not surprising
that these should be seen in the West as small-scale replicas of the SOviet
Union. '!he existence of communist governments there seemed simple to
explain: except in Yugoslavia aM Aloania, they had been installed oy
RIss ian commissar s following in the wake of the Red Army. As Western
scholars saw it, the advent of communism Drought several centuries of
indigenous political development to an end. As Soviet "sa telli tes" these
countr ies were presumed to have no politics or economics, out to be uooer
the domination and direction of the Soviet Union, with everything of
significance decided in l-bscow. In those days i t was easy for a student of
the SOViet tllion to also oecome an expert on Fastem Ellrope: one sinply
added the phrase "aM in Eastern Ellrope as well" to any statement about the
SOViet tllion. One measure of the progress that has been made in the study
of Eastern Ellrope over the past two decades is that we have almost cured
our colleagues in Soviet studies of this sort of intellectual
imper ialism. 10
In these twenty years we have learned that Eastern Ellrope is not merely
a replica of the Soviet ll1ion, and also that it is itself not all of a
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piece. Prior to the advent of communist rule, these countries had a
variety of political and economic experiences. Poland had its long period
of partition, with different regions governed by Prussia, Russia and
Austria. The Czech lands, especially Bohemia, had served as an industrial
and urban heartland of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Hungary had
developed as that empire's granary. The areas which make up present-day
Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia had all been part of the Ottoman
Empire, although each area had experienced Ottoman domination in a
somewhat different way. Once they became independent of Ottoman rule, each
of these Southeastern European countries developed strong political and
economic ties with Western Europe and with Czarist Russia. After World War
I, ties with the West became stronger than ever and throughout Eastern
Europe, in the 1930s and 40s, German influence expanded into outright
economic and political domination. The fall of the Third Reich marked the
beginning of the transition to socialism.
The varied experiences of these countries prior to the advent of
socialism, combined with their equally varied geographical circumstances
and natural resources, has led each to shape its own distinctive brand of
socialism. As Western scholars have gathered ever more detailed
information about the past and present of these countries, they have become
increasingly cautious in making generalizations about the area as a whole.
My decision to limit my remarks to Southeastern Europe was intended as a
modest dramatization of this point.
As the study of the countries of Southeastern Europe has gained its
place in Western scholarship, three observations have shaped conventional
understanding of the way in which modern conditions of life have developed
there. First, they are socialist states ideologically dominated by
Marxist-Leninist thought and under varying degrees of Soviet influence.
Second, they are making determined efforts to become modern, developed
countries. Third, however distinctive their histories may be, they are
nevertheless European countries. While these observations appear to be
self-evident, I contend that dwelling upon them has tended to inhibit a
realistic understanding of Southeastern Europe. 11
To begin with, there is an a priori assumption that communism is
inherently bad or evil. A whole vocabulary of perjorative terms is applied
to communist countries in both journalistic and scholarly writings. Words
and phrases such as "totalitarian," "repression," "censorship," "drab,"
"police state," and "godless" are freely used, reflecting value judgments
and springing from the writer's preference for his own political and
economic system. As such, they are a form of ethnocentrism which can
influence the nature of scholarship. These attitudes virtually ensure that
no matter how "objective" a scholar intends to be, his or her conclusions
will ultimately be cast in a negative vein. When the scholar is dealing
with a communist country in Southeastern Europe, the problem can be
compounded for the very terms "Byzantine" and "Balkan" have come to have
negative connotations in the English language.
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In evaluating the performance of these countries, one inevitably compares them with the United States and with the countries of Western Europe
because they share the same continental setting and grand cultural heritage
and because the general theory of modernization provides the framework for
comparative analysis. All of the versions of modernization theory have in
common a model of developed based on the growth of urban industrial society
in the West. To compare Southeastern Europe with the Western democracies,
various economic, demographic and social statistics are used to serve as
indicators of development. Inevitably, the countries of Southeastern
Europe suffer in the comparison. They are less modern, and, whatever their
progress, they continue to lag well behind the West. Conclusions of this
sort reinforce preconceived assumptions about the "evils" of communism by
demonstrating its economic and social failings. Qualitative research by
political analysts which promotes invidious comparisons between West and
East of qualities of freedom, human rights and political participation
further substantiates these "evils."
While research fitting roughly into the above mold has dominated
Western scholarship about Southeastern Europe, there have been studies
which take a somewhat different tack. 12 This research begins with the
observation that the countries of Southeastern Europe have followed a path
into the modern world fundamentally different from that of the countries of
Northwestern Europe. In the 19th century, when the peoples of the Balkans
were emerging from Ottoman rule, the countries of Northwestern Europe ,were
already well established as capitalist industrial nation-states. The
combination of national movements and international interests which
destroyed Ottoman power in Europe also paved the way for Western influence
in the former Ottoman lands, and in the course of the 19th century
Southeastern Europe became firmly integrated into the Western economic
sphere. This penetration tied agricultural production in Southeastern
Europe to the requirements of the West, inhibited industrial development,
and served to create and perpetuate agrarian society there. While the
nature of these societies was rooted in their past, the form that they took
late in the 19th century and early in the 20th century was in large measure
a product of their attempts to meet the demands and opportunities growing
out of their ties with the West. In the process they became countries with
severe "peasant problems." The political parties which vied with one
another in the period between the world wars made little progress toward
solving this problem, and it was, if anything, intensified by Nazi German
domination and the trauma of World War II.
The experience of Southeastern Europe in becoming an agrarian hinterland of industrial Europe parallels that of other world areas. Similar
processes creating agrarian societies geared to production for industrial
Europe and the United States took place in much of Mediterranean Europe,
North and West Africa, South, East and Southeast Asia, and Latin America.
While differing radically in cultural traditions and climatic and
geographic circumstances, these areas came to share many political, economic, and social forms as a result of these common experiences.
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Since the end of World War II, economic and social development in these
agrarian states has been approached in various ways, associated with many
forms of political organization. When examined in the context of these
agrarian countries, rather than compared with advanced industrial nations,
the experiences of Southeastern Europe look rather different: their accomplishments appear in a much more favorable light. In general, they have
achieved more industrialization and are sustaining a higher rate of
economic growth;l3 their urbanization has been carried out in a far more
balanced and controlled fashion with concomitantly fewer urban problems;
unemployment and underemployment are insignificant; basic education is
virtually universal and "upward mobility" through access to higher
education is widely available; a variety of social programs promote the
well-being of the general population. Moreover, they are more successful
than other agrarian states in retaining the capital they generate for
reinvestment and they suffer fewer problems resulting from the emigration
of the most skilled and educated of their population. 14
Conclusions
Detailed field research conducted within the countries of Southeastern
Europe is contributing to a more accurate and sophisticated understanding
of their internal dynamics. Additionally, an analytic framework which
examines this area in relationship to others with similar agrarian histories is providing an alternative to conve,ntional ways of interpreting
their problems, accomplishments, and future potential. At the very least,
the scholarship I have been discussing represents an expansion of information and modes of analysis available to individuals who are interested in
Southeastern Europe. It may also have significance for the kinds of
policies that Western states develop with respect to both the nations of
Southeastern Europe and to agrarian nations in other parts of the world.
The socialist states of Southeastern Europe, although differing from
one another in the particulars of policy and practice, have made economic
and social advances which compare very favorably with non-socialist
agrarian states in other areas. As these states have established their own
individual brands of socialism and have experienced some success with
modernization, they have become increasingly independent-minded in foreign
economic and political relations. Yugoslavia is certainly a case in point,
as are Romania and Poland. Policies of detente toward this part of the
world seem to be a good idea.
Moreover, policies designed to frustrate the development of socialist
states in other world areas are probably ill-advised. My hypothesis is
that agrarian states which become socialist have better development
prospects than do those that do not. 15 If even members of the Warsaw Pact
can begin to develop independent aspects to their foreign relations, it
seems likely that socialist states in the Third World can be expected to
maintain a relatively unaligned stance. Encouragement and assistance from
the West rather than opposition should make this even more likely.
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NOTES
1. Cyril Black discusses the genesis of the totalitarian model and how it
came to be applied to the Soviet Union and Eastern European states in A
Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges, IREX Occasional Papers, Vol. l,-No.
1). It should be noted that not all authorities who use this model
attribute totalitarianism to communist parties. Some see it as inherent in
Russian culture or in the cultures of the various East European states,
with roots deep in history.
2. An outstanding example of a volume conceived in the mold of convergence
theory is Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies,
edited by Mark G. Field (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
See especially the article in this volume by T. Anthony Jones, "Modernization and Social Development," pp. 19-49. A general critique of convergence
theory is to be found in Reinhard Skinner's insightful article, "Technological Determinism: A Critique of Convergence Theory," Comparative Studies
in Soci~and History, Vol. 18, No.1 (1976), pp. 2-27.
3. Several recent volumes which demonstrate both the potential and the
limits of this mode of analysis are the Field volume, ~ cit.: Gail
Lapidus, Women in Soyiet Society (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1978): Walter D. Connor, Socialism, Politics and Equality (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979): and Trond/Gilberg, Modernization in Romania
Since Wo~ld War II (New York: Praeger, 1975).
4. An authoritative presentation of this perspective for Europe, both East
and West, is S.H. Franklin, The E~ropean P~asant: The Fin~l Phase (London,
Methuen, 1969), especially pp. 1-20 and 218-234. It also dominates textbook social science and works in general theory. However, in the course of
the past two decades a series of monographs on social organization in
worker communities in the industrial West has appeared which contradicts
the general expectation: cf. Michael Young and Peter Wilmott, Family and
Kin in East London (Baltimore: Penguin, 1957): Mirra Komarovsky, Blue
Collar Marriage-(New York: Random House, 1967). Michael Anderson outlines
the dilemma of the lack of fit between general theory and specific case
studies in his Family St~ucture in 19th-Cent~~~~q~shire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1971). Such works as these, demonstrating the
ongoing strength of kith and kin relations in the heart of the industrial
West make it difficult to accept the premise that such relations will
wither away with modernization in Eastern Europe.
5. Cf. M. Cernea, "The Large-Scale Formal Organization and the Family
Group," Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 37, No.4 (1975), pp. 927936.
6. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of research in other
parts of Southeastern Europe. The literature in English is richest for
Yugoslavia, where research by American and British scholars has been
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ongoing since the mid-1950s. Among the many works which touch on the role
of kith and kin in the process of social change are: Joel M. Halpern, A
Se~bian Village: Social and Cultural Change in a Y~~slav Community (New
York: Harper & ROw, 1967); E.A. Hammel, "Social Mobility, Economic
Change and Kinship in Serbia," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol.
25 (1969), pp. 188-197; William Lockwood, European Moslems: Economy and
Ethnicity in Western Bosnia (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Ba~~~nistica,
Volume III, Peasant Culture and N~tional Culture in Southeastern Europ~
(Ann Arbor: Slavica Publishers, 1976). An indispensable aid to the study
of social relations in Southeastern Europe is Irwin Sanders, Roger
Whitaker, and Walter C. Bisselle, eds., East European Peasantries: Social
Relations. An Annotated Bibliography of Periodical Articles (Boston:
G.K. Hall, 1976).
7. David Kideckel, "The Dialectic of Rural Development: Cooperative Farm
Goals and Family Strategies in a Romanian Commune," Journal of Rural
Cooperatio~, Vol. V, No.1 (1977), pp. 43-62.
8. David Kideckel, Agricultural Cooperativism in a Ro~~~~an Commune, Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1979, pp. 90-94.
9. This is, of course, hardly unique to the study of Southeastern European
societies. Two works which examine this as a general method are Abner
Cohen, Two Dim~nsional Man: An E~say on t~e Anthropology of Power anq
~lism in Complex Socie~ (London: Routledge & Kegan paul, 1974), and
L.A. Fallers, ~he Social Anthropology of the Nation State (Chicago:
Aldine, 1974).
10. However, the ongoing imperious attitude of our more numerous Soviet
and Russian studies colleagues is indicated by the fact that those of us
who study Albanians, Estonians, Finns, Gypsies, (East) Germans, Hungarians,
Lapps, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Romanians are expected to join a professional association called the American Association for the Advancement
of Slavic Studies. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs is no doubt
responsible for the recent formation of the American Association for Southeast European Studies.
11. The problem of regarding Europe as all of one piece and of applying
modernization/development models derived from the experiences of Northwestern Europe to other parts of the continent are discussed in John W.
Cole, "Anthropology Comes part-Way Home: Community Studies in Europe,"
Annual Re~~ew of Anthropology, Vol. 6, pp. 349-378 (Palo Alto, 1977: Annual
Reviews, Inc.).
12. One approach is the "world systems" viewpoint developed by Immanuel
Wallerstein in The Modern World Syste~: Capitalist A~riculture a~d th~
Origins qf the European World-Economy in the S~~teenth Century (New York:
Acade~ic Press, 1974) and in numerous articles.
It also dominates the
articles published in Review, a journal edited by Wallerstein. Daniel
Chirot's volume, Social Change in a Perip~eral Society: The Creation
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of a Balkan Colony (New York: Academic Press, 1976) is cast in the same
mold. The development of ties of dependency between East-Central Europe
and Northwestern Europe is traced with insight and intellectual rigor by
Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki in Economic Development in East-Central
Europe in the 19th and 20th Cen~uries (New York: Columbia University,
Press, 1974). Ethnic~ty and Nationalism in ~~~~heastern Europe, Sam Beck
and John W. Cole, eds., is largely devoted to an examination of the
relationship between ethnicity, nationalism, and economic dependency in
Southeastern Europe. For Romania, see Kenneth Jowitt, ed., Social Change
in Romani~, 1860-1940: A D~~ate on Development in a European Nation
(University of California, Institute of International Studies, Research
Series No. 37, 1978).
13. John W. Meyer, John Boli-Bennett, and Christopher Chase-Dunn, "Convergence and Divergence in Development," Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.
1, pp. 223-246 (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1975).
14. It would take a second essay, longer and more involved than this one,
to examine the assumptions made by Western scholars (Marxist and positivist
alike) that the human costs of Eastern European achievements are excessive.
Western comments on the human condition in Eastern Europe are made against
either idealized versions of "freedom" in the industrialized West, or an
abstract concept of human rights. They rarely take into account the
specific problems faced by small nations attempting to modernize.
Condemnation of East European states for severely restricting emigrants and
foreign travel ignore the implications of open borders for small countries.
In the European context, open borders in small modernizing states have
meant a "brain drain" and an ongoing export of labor to industrial Northwestern Europe. Case studies, such as that by Jane and Peter Schneider on
Sicily, Culture and Political Economy in Western Sicily (New York, 1976i
Academic Press) and surveys such as S. Castles and G. Rosack, Immigrant
Workers and Class Structure in Western E~ (London, 1973: Oxford
University Press) suggest that the human costs of open borders may be at
least as severe as closed ones.
15. One of the few attempts to assess the quality of the human condition
in societies which have undergone revolution and those which have not is
Susan Ekstein, The Impact of Revolution on Social Welfare in Latin America
(Theory and Society 11(1):43-94, 1982).

174

